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COMMENT
A MILITARY EXCEPTION TO
"INFORMED CONSENT": DOE v.
SULLIVAN
The doctrine of informed consent' preserves an individual's
control over his body2 by protecting the right to make intelligent
' See EUGENE I. PAVALON, HUmA RIGHTS AND HEALTH CARE LAW, 25-33 (1980). Before
a treatment plan involving some risk to the patient may be initiated, the risks and alterna-
tives must be disclosed to the patient. Id. at 25. The voluntary understanding and compe-
tent consent of the patient is required before a physician may undertake the treatment. Id.
The principle of "informed consent" has been commended by legal academia as a protector
of individual rights, and criticized by health professionals as a "myth" and a "fiction." See
Alan Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Be-
tween Competing Values in Medical Decision Making, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 413, 413 (1979).
Critics of informed consent claim that its emphasis on individualistic values frustrates com-
peting values. Id. at 415. Conversely, proponents contend that the doctrine protects individ-
ualism by allowing patients to determine their own destiny in medical matters. Id. at 414,
416-17.
Failure to provide adequate information generally gives rise to an action in medical
negligence or in battery. See Marcus L. Plante, An Analysis of "Informed Consent", 36
FORDHAAi L. REV. 639, 650-56 (1968). Cases involving lack of informed consent generally
sound in negligence; such claims are premised on the physician's duty of care to disclose
risks, absent a justification for failing to do so, and the patient's presumed lack of consent
had they been disclosed. Recent Cases, Physicians Duty to Warn of Possible Adverse Re-
sults of Proposed Treatment Depends Upon General Practice Followed By Medical Profes-
sion in the Community - Di Filippo v. Preston, 75 HARv. L. REv. 1445, 1446-47 (1962); see
Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 851 F.2d 437, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Berroyer v. Hertz, 672 F.2d
334, 342 (3d Cir. 1982); Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 716 (N.D. Ill.
1978). Battery claims arise from the general rule that an unauthorized touching constitutes
a battery. See Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 13 (Minn. 1905); Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford,
141 U.S. 250, 252 (1891) ("To compel anyone.., to submit to the touch of a stranger ... is
an ... assault and trespass."); Bendiburg v. Dempsey, 909 F.2d 463, 469 (11th Cir. 1990) (in
absence of consent, surgery is a battery); Hernandez v. United States, 465 F. Supp. 1071,
1073 (D. Kan. 1979) (holding medical procedures performed without consent an assault and
battery under federal and Kansas law); see also Plante, supra, at 657-58 (discussing battery
cases).
2 See Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2846 (1990).
This notion of bodily integrity has been embodied in the requirement that in-
formed consent is generally required for medical treatment. Justice Cardozo, while
on the Court of Appeals of New York, aptly described this doctrine: "Every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall
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decisions concerning medical treatment or experiments' based
be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his
patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages."
Id. at 2846-47 (quoting Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N. E. 92, 93 (N.Y.
1914)). The right to "inviolability of his person, in other words, his right to himself," has
been called a citizen's first and greatest right. Rolater v. Strain, 137 P. 96, 97 (Okla. 1913)
(citations omitted). The notion that every individual has the right to possession and control
of his own body without interference was firmly established at common law. See Union Pac.
Ry., 141 U.S. at 251; see also Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2846-47 (patients possess right to refuse
medical treatment). Every part of the body is protected from intentional and unpermitted
contacts, and the plaintiff need not be conscious at the time of the contact for a violation to
occur. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 9, at 39-40
(5th ed. 1984). The integrity of the body is considered to be so important that, unlike in
other areas of tort law, proof of harm is not necessary; the technical invasion itself warrants
awarding damages to vindicate the violated right. See Mohr, 104 N.W. at 13; cf. Mason v.
Wrightson, 109 A.2d 128, 130-132 (Md. 1954) (unwarranted search of criminal defendant
resulted in award of nominal damages for "humiliation").
' See George J. Annas, Mengele's Birthmark: The Nuremberg Code in United States
Courts, 7 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 17, 21 (1991) (Nuremberg Code, deemed most
complete and authoritative statement of law of informed consent pertaining to human ex-
perimentation, requires informed, voluntary consent of research subject.) Prior to World
War II, there were no recorded cases of non-therapeutic experimentation reaching the ap-
pellate courts. Id. at 22 n.16. By World War II, courts began to appreciate the value of
therapeutic and non-therapeutic experimentation to the progress of medicine and required
the consent of the patient. Id. at 22-23; see also Fortner v. Koch, 261 N.W. 762, 765 (Mich.
1935) (recognizing need for medical experimentation with consent of patient). The role of
experimentation in the medical field became more accepted by the 1940s, and consent of the
patient became essential. See Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 121-22 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (re-
quiring consent of fifteen year old capable of consenting to experimental skin graft to aid
cousin where parent also impliedly consented); Stammer v. Board of Regents, 39 N.E.2d
913, 914-15 (N.Y. 1942) (doctor cured facial cancer with medication invented by another
patient).
As a result of the atrocities committed by Nazi physicians during World War II, the
Military Tribunals at Nuremberg issued "The Nuremberg Code." See United States v.
Brandt, 2 TRIAL OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRMUNAL UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 at 181, reprinted in JAY KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH
HUMAN BEINGS 305-06 (1972) (setting forth ten principles stated in judgment at Nuremberg
trials now known as Nuremberg Code). The first of the Code's ten points mandates com-
plete, voluntary consent of the subject as a prerequisite to experimentation. Id. Although
the Code is considered "part of international common law," United States courts have only
infrequently cited it in civil cases, and have never applied it in a criminal case. See Annas,
supra, at 21.
For a discussion of the federal approach to regulation of human experimentation and its
deficiencies, see Richard Delgado & Helen Leskovac, Informed Consent in Human Experi-
mentation: Bridging the Gap Between Ethical Thought and Current Practice, 34 UCLA L.
REV. 67, 70-80, 92-96 (1986); see also 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (1991) (discussing policy of Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services for all federal research involving human subjects);
GEORGE J. ANNAS ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION: THE SUBJECT'S
DILEMMA (1977) (discussing application of doctrine of informed consent to human experi-
mentation for various types of research and subjects).
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upon full disclosure of the facts and possible consequences.4 The
underlying policy 5 suggests that an individual's right to balance
the risks and benefits of a particular treatment' should not be sub-
ordinated to societal concerns of maintaining health' or advancing
medical science.s These larger concerns prevail, however, under
" See John Norman, Note, Physicians and Surgeons: Informed Consent, 20 OKLA. L.
REV. 214, 215-16 (1967). The duty of the physician is to disclose to the patient the dangers
and consequences of the medical procedure of which the surgeon has knowledge. Id. at 216.
The extent of this duty depends on various factors, including the "seriousness of the result,"
the condition of the patient, and the "necessity of treatment." Id. at 215-16. What began as
a simple principle of law has developed into a complex doctrine. FAY A. RozovsKy, CONSENT
TO TREATriENT, A PRACTICAL GumE xxxi (2d ed. 1990). Today, informed consent requires
that the physician provide basic information, id. at § 1.12; describe alternative choices, id. at
§ 1.12.2; allow a reasonable time to weigh the risks and benefits, id. at § 1.12.1; and answer
patients' questions, id. at § 1.9; see also 21 C.F.R. § 50.25 (1991) (stating elements of in-
formed consent).
' See Lipscomb v. Memorial Hosp., 733 F.2d 332, 336 (4th Cir. 1984) ("paramount pur-
pose" of informed consent doctrine is "the patient's right to determine what shall be done
with his body and when") (quoting Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014, 1021-22 (Md. 1977));
Lambert v. Park, 597 F.2d 236, 238-39 (10th Cir. 1979) (vital social policy behind informed
consent is that "a physician should be required to disclose to his patients all material risks
of a proposed procedure even if other doctors in the community or specialty would not have
made so full a disclosure"); Wachter v. United States, 689 F. Supp. 1420, 1423 (D. Md.
1988)(purpose of informed consent doctrine "is to assure that the patient is informed of
alternative treatments"), aff'd, 877 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1989); see also ROBERT J. LEVINE,
ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH, ch. 5, at 70 (1981) ("[I]nformed consent is
designed to uphold the ethical principles of respect for persons.").
See Note, Restructuring Informed Consent: Legal Therapy for the Doctor Patient
Relationship, 79 YALE L.J. 1533, 1534-35 (1970). The balancing of risks and benefits is an
individual struggle; what appears to be an undue risk to one person may be seen as a benefit
to another. Id. The individual, possessing much of the relevant information as to his own
well-being, is in the best position to decide whether to undergo a particular treatment. See
id. A more participatory approach to medical decision-making, where the patient weighs the
alternative courses of action, may increase the patient's incentive to accept treatment. Id.
7 See Meisel, supra note 1, at 423-25 ("The law often reflects a strong societal interest
in promoting health at the expense of individualistic values."). An example of the state's use
of police power to promote public health is compulsory vaccination against contagious dis-
ease. See Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 21 (1905) (upholding compulsory vaccina-
tion). The exceptions to the general rule of informed consent, e.g., emergency, help balance
the societal interest in health with the individual's interest in informed decision-making.
See Meisel, supra note 1, at 433.
8 See LEVINE, supra note 5, at 73-89 (requiring informed consent for procedures known
as treatment or research). Some researchers have regarded informed consent as an obstacle
to experimentation. See Milton Oppenheim, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment, 11
CLEV. MARSHALL L. REV. 249, 261 (1962). The countervailing policy consideration they cite is
that by rendering some research more difficult or impossible, the severely ill may be denied
new, effective treatments. See Robert L. Schwartz, Informed Consent to Participation in
Medical Research Employing Elderly Human Subjects, 1 J. CoNTrrMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
115, 117 (1985). Balancing these conflicting interests is a matter of social policy and the U.S.
has leaned toward protecting the rights of autonomy over the value of research. Id. While
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certain exceptions to the informed consent doctrine, for example,
in emergency situations, or when the patient is incompetent.9
Federal statutes recognize the right of informed consent in all
persons, both civilians and military servicemembers. 1° One such
statute, the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act ("FDCA"), requires
that consent be obtained before investigational drugs" are admin-
istered to any human being.'2 Recently, however, in Doe v. Sulli-
incidents of neglecting individual rights are remembered, such as the Nazi experiments, the
effect of unrealized research is not. Id. (discussing distinction between "research" and
"treatment").
I See Meisel, supra note 1, at 486. There is an exception to the doctrine where circum-
stances indicate that full disclosure of all facts and possibilities would be unwise, for exam-
ple, where the patient is unstable or depressed. See, e.g., Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093,
1103 (Kan. 1960). A second exception is recognized where an emergency necessitates imme-
diate action to save a patient's life and consent cannot be obtained from the patient or his
legal representative. See, e.g., Franklyn v. Peabody, 228 N.W. 681, 682 (Mich. 1930) (condi-
tion not so serious an emergency to warrant exception to informed consent).
1o See Defense Authorization Act § 1401(c)(1), 10 U.S.C. § 980 (1988). The Defense
Authorization Act prohibits the use of DOD funds for research involving human beings as
experimental subjects unless the informed consent of the subject has been obtained. Id.
Under the "Feres Doctrine," however, the United States is not liable under the Federal
Torts Claims Act for injuries to servicemembers that arise out of or are incident to military
service. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (1988); see Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950);
Annas, supra note 3 at 31-32. Thus, a servicemember would be precluded from seeking mon-
etary damages for injuries caused by involuntary submission to administration of drugs or
participation in other experiments while in the military. See United States v. Stanley, 483
U.S. 669, 683-84 (1987). However, actions to halt or prevent a violation are still possible. Id.
In Stanley, the plaintiff, while a member of the armed services, had consented to take
part in a test of protective clothing for chemical warfare. Id. at 671. Instead, Stanley was
secretly administered lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). Id. Hallucinations and outbreaks of
violence caused by the LSD resulted in personality changes and the dissolution of his mar-
riage. Id. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could not seek monetary damages for
violations of his rights. Id. at 683-84. In a scathing dissent, Justice Brennan cited the Nu-
remberg Code and stated that the denial of money damages results in absolute immunity for
federal officials who violate constitutional rights of servicemembers. Id. at 691 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); see also Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1229-30, 1234-35 (3d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982) (denying recovery to serviceman exposed to nuclear fallout
from a nuclear bomb experiment).
11 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.34 (1991) (outlining guidelines and circumstances for implemen-
tation of Treatment IND process); Myron L. Marlin, Treatment INDs: A Faster Route To
Drug Approval?, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 171 (1989). The FDCA, under a procedure known as
"Treatment Use of an Investigational New Drug," or "Treatment IND," provides a new
route to drug approval, wherein individuals with serious or life-threatening diseases may
access experimental drugs. Id. at 172. The Treatment IND procedure facilitates the "availa-
bility of promising new drugs to desperately ill patients as early in the drug development
process as possible, before general marketing begins, and [obtains] additional data on the
drug's safety and effectiveness." 21 C.F.R. § 312.34 (1991).
" See Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 355(j) (1988).
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van,13 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
upheld a Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") rule that per-
mits the Commissioner of Food and Drugs, at the request of the
Department of Defense ("DOD"), to waive this informed consent
requirement in certain combat situations.
14
In Sullivan, the plaintiff, Doe, a serviceman stationed in Saudi
Arabia during the Desert Shield military operation, brought a class
action suit on behalf of all the servicemembers stationed in the
Persian Gulf region at the time."5 The DOD had anticipated the
use in that conflict of chemical and biological agents by the
Iraqis.16 It had identified two investigational drugs which it be-
lieved would be effective as a pretreatment administered to combat
personnel to counter the effects of these agents.'1 Although the two
drugs had been approved by the FDA for the treatment of other
illnesses, they had not been approved for use as a defense to chem-
ical and biological warfare. 8 The DOD believed that mandatory
use of these drugs by combat personnel would be necessary for
their survival and that obtaining informed consent during the mili-
tary operation would not be practicable. 19 However, no existing
regulatory exception to the FDCA would allow the DOD to admin-
ister these drugs without informed consent.20 Accordingly, at the
DOD's request, the FDA promulgated Rule 23(d) which allows the
Commissioner of Food and Drugs to waive the informed consent
requirement for the use of investigational drugs where certain bat-
tlefield or combat-related situations render consent "not feasi-
ble."'" Subsequently, pursuant to FDA Rule 23(d), the Commis-
,3 938 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
14 Id. at 1383.
11 Id. at 1374. The serviceman's wife was also a plaintiff. Id.
1" Id. at 1371-72.
17 Id. at 1372-73.
18 Id. at 1372 n.1. Pyridostigmine bromide is approved for the treatment of myasthenia
gravis, a neuromuscular disorder. The DOD proposed to administer only 15% of the average
daily dosage used to treat the disorder in civilians. Id. Pentavalent botulinum toxoid vaccine
is used to prevent botulism. Id. The drugs had not been approved for use as a defense to
chemical or biological warfare because in order to prove the drugs' efficacy for these pur-
poses humans would have to be exposed to the chemical or biological agents, which is con-
sidered to be too risky. Id.
19 Id. at 1373.
20 Id.; see Food and Drug Administration Rule 23(a)-(c), 21 C.F.R. § 50.23(a)-(c)
(1991)(providing exceptions to requirement for informed consent).
11 Sullivan, 938 F.2d at 1373; 21 C.F.R. § 50.23(d) (1991) (Rule 23(d)) (exception from
general requirement of informed consent). Rule 23(d) reads in full:
(d)(1) The Commissioner may also determine that obtaining informed consent is
1992]
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sioner waived the informed consent requirement for the two
drugs.2
In order to prevent the involuntary administering of these
drugs, Doe filed suit in the District Court for the District of Co-
not feasible when the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) requests
such a determination in connection with the use of an investigational drug (in-
cluding an antibiotic or biological product) in a specific protocol under an investi-
gational new drug application (IND) sponsored by the Department of Defense
(DOD). DOD's request for a determination that obtaining informed consent from
military personnel is not feasible must be limited to a specific military operation
involving combat or the immediate threat of combat. The request must also in-
clude a written justification supporting the conclusions of the physician(s) respon-
sible for the medical care of the military personnel involved and the investiga-
tor(s) identified in the IND that a military combat exigency exists because of
special military combat (actual or threatened) circumstances in which, in order to
facilitate the accomplishment of the military mission, preservation of the health of
the individual and the safety of other personnel require that a particular treat-
ment be provided to a specified group of military personnel, without regard to
what might be any individual's personal preference for no treatment or for some
alternative treatment. The written request must also include a statement that a
duly constituted institutional review board has reviewed and approved the use of
the investigation drug without informed consent. The Commissioner may find that
informed consent is not feasible only when withholding treatment would be con-
trary to the best interests of military personnel and there is no available satisfac-
tory alternative therapy.
(2) In reaching a determination under paragraph (d)(1) of this section that ob-
taining informed consent is not feasible and withholding treatment would be con-
trary to the best interests of military personnel, the Commissioner will review the
request submitted under paragraph (d)(1) of this section and take into account all
pertinent factors, including, but not limited to:
(i) The extent and strength of the evidence of the safety and effectiveness of the
investigational drug for the intended use;
(ii) The context in which the drug will be administered, e.g., whether it is in-
tended for use in a battlefield or hospital setting or whether it will be self-admin-
istered or will be administered by a health professional;
(iii) The nature of the disease or condition for which the preventive or therapeutic
treatment is intended; and
(iv) The nature of the information to be provided to the recipients of the drug
concerning the potential benefits and risks of taking or not taking the drug.
(3) The Commissioner may request a recommendation from appropriate experts
before reaching a determination on a request submitted under paragraph (d)(1) of
this section.
(4) A determination by the Commissioner that obtaining informed consent is not
feasible and withholding treatment would be contrary to the best interests of mili-
tary personnel will expire at the end of one year, unless renewed at DOD's re-
quest, or when DOD informs the Commissioner that the specific military opera-
tion creating the need for the use of the investigational drug has ended, whichever
is earlier. The Commissioner may also revoke this determination based on
changed circumstances.
Id. 22 Sullivan, 938 F.2d at 1374.
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lumbia seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.23 Doe challenged
Rule 23(d) as being, on its face, outside the scope of authority
granted to the FDA in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.24 Doe
further asserted that Rule 23(d) and section 1401(c)(1) of the De-
fense Department Authorization Act ("DOD Act"),25 which prohib-
its the use of DOD funds for "research" on human subjects with-
out their informed consent, could not be reconciled. 26 Additionally,
Doe claimed that forcing non-approved drugs on servicemembers
without their consent violated their constitutional right to due pro-
cess.27 The district court granted the defendant's motion to dis-
miss, holding that the issue was not amenable to judicial review
because it was a decision of military strategy. 2s Nevertheless, the
district court stated its belief that Rule 23(d) was within the
FDA's statutory rulemaking authority, and that its application
during the Persian Gulf operations did not violate the FDCA.29
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit affirmed, upholding the FDA's authority to promulgate
Rule 23(d).30 Writing for the court, Judge Bader Ginsberg held
that the issue was amenable to judicial review because the FDA
ruling could not be considered a strategic military decision.31 The
court of appeals found that the provision of the FDCA which dis-
penses with the informed consent requirement when such consent
11 Doe v. Sullivan, 756 F. Supp. 12 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 938 F.2d 1374 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
24 Sullivan, 938 F.2d at 1374.
25 10 U.S.C. § 980 (1988).
2 Sullivan, 938 F.2d at 1374-75.
27 Id. at 1375.
28 Sullivan, 756 F. Supp. at 14.
2 Id. at 16. The court also held that Rule 23(d) did not violate the DOD Act and that
the application of the rule did not deprive the plaintiff of "liberty without due process." Id.
at 14-17. The court also found that the "DOD's decision to use unapproved drugs is pre-
cisely the type of military decision that courts have repeatedly refused to second-guess." Id.
at 15.
30 Sullivan, 938 F.2d at 1381. In addition, the court affirmed the district court holding
that there had been no violation of the plaintiff's due process rights. Id.
In a vigorous dissent, then Circuit Judge Clarence Thomas found the issue moot as
there no longer existed any case or controversy since the war had long since ended. Id. at
1384-85 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Judge Thomas noted that judicial review in this situation
was only permissible where there existed a "reasonable expectation that the same com-
plaining party [will] be subjected to the same action yet again." Id. at 1385 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975)) (alteration in original).
It was not reasonably likely, Judge Thomas asserted, that this same complaining party will
again be personally subjected to identical FDA and DOD action. Id.
11 Id. at 1380. The court reasoned that the FDA is a non-military agency, and that the
plaintiff was not challenging a military command, but rather the authority of the FDA. Id.
19921
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is "not feasible" was ambiguous and that the FDA's construction
of this term in Rule 23(d) was "'well within the ordinary meaning'
of the words Congress used." 2 Thus, following the Supreme
Court's rationale in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council,33 the court held that it was bound to defer to the FDA's
construction. 4 The court further held that the DOD Act did not
restrict the authority of the FDA to promulgate Rule 23(d). 5 The
question whether the DOD was within its authority to administer
the drugs was not addressed.3 6
In light of the unique demands of a military unit in combat, it
is submitted that the need for a military exception to the informed
consent doctrine is manifest. This Comment will discuss the nature
of chemical warfare and will propose that the use of the drugs at
issue was necessary to ensure not only the survival of individual
servicemembers, but also that of their unit co-members. This Com-
ment will also assert that the Sullivan court was correct in finding
that the promulgation of Rule 23(d) was within the statutory au-
thority of the FDA. Furthermore, it will suggest that Rule 23(d) is
narrowly tailored, since it only applies to combat exigencies, and
thus affords protection against abuses.
I. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE: THE NEED FOR A
MILITARY EXCEPTION TO INFORMED CONSENT
Modern chemical weapons, s nerve agents now possessed by
32 Id. at 1382 (quoting Sullivan, 756 F. Supp. at 16). The FDA read the term "not
feasible" to include "impracticable" and the court held this to be a permissible construction.
See Sullivan, 756 F. Supp. at 16.
3 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding EPA's regulations established pursuant to Clean Air Act
to be permissible construction).
Sullivan, 938 F.2d at 1382; see infra notes 65-67 (discussing deference to administra-
tive constructions).
35 Id. at 1383. The court held that the DOD Act "limits the authority of the Depart-
ment of Defense, not the authority of the Food and Drug Commissioner." Id.
36 Id. at 1383. The specific applications of FDA Rule 23(d) in the Gulf War were ren-
dered moot by the end of the hostilities; Doe's challenges were limited to a facial attack on
the validity of the rule. Id. at 1375.
37 See REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL: CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGI-
CAL) WEAPONS AND THE EFFECTS OF THEIR POSSIBLE USE, at 5, U.N. Sales No. E.691.24 (1969)
[hereinafter REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL]. Broadly defined, chemical warfare agents
include "[c]hemical substances, whether gaseous, liquid or solid, which might be employed
because of their direct toxic effects on man, animals, and plants". Id. The first large scale
use of chemical weapons was in the first World War. Various substances, kmown as "gas,"
were used by both sides to cause choking, burns, blisters, and death. See EDWARD M. SPIERS,
CHEMICAL WEAPONRY 4 (1989). In 1915, the first gas attack took 5000 lives. REPORT OF THE
[Vol. 66:847
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Iraq and many other countries,s cause drooling, staggering, confu-
sion, and involuntary defecation and urination and are capable of
causing death within one to fifteen minutes.3 9 Biological agents
spread contagious diseases such as cholera and botulism among an
enemy's military and populace.40 As the technology used to de-
velop and deploy chemical and biological weapons has advanced,
so have the defenses available to neutralize their effects. 41 Modern
protective gear,42 however, will provide adequate protection only if
there is early warning of an attack43 and the amount of the agent is
SECRETARY GENERAL at 5. By the end of the war, the use of over 125,000 tons of toxic chemi-
cals had caused 100,000 deaths and 1,200,000 other casualties. Id. The agents used in World
War I were much less toxic, and the means of dispersal were much less efficient than mod-
ern day agents and methods. Id.
38 SpEias, supra note 37, at 191. As of 1986, France, the United States, and the Soviet
Union were known to possess modern chemical weapons, and eleven countries, including
Libya, China, Syria and Burma reportedly possessed them. Id.
39 Id. at 4. Nerve agents are stored as liquids and dispersed as either vapor or a spray of
liquid droplets. Id. The agent can penetrate the body through exposed skin or by inhalation.
Id. By reacting with enzymes, the nerve agent causes a loss of control over the nervous
system and allows a rapid accumulation of powerful poisons. Id. Respiratory lethal dosages
kill in one to fifteen minutes, while death through absorption may be delayed up to two
hours. Id. Nerve agents are considered the most effective lethal chemicals used in warfare.
Id. The amount of nerve agent that would fit on the head of a pin is enough to kill one
person. See NEIL C. LIVINGSTONE, ET AL., CBW: THE POOR MAN'S ATOMIC BoM 4-5 (1984).
40 MOSBY'S MEDICAL, NURSING, AND ALLIED HEALTH DICTIONARY 164 (3d ed. 1990). Botu-
lism is characterized by muscle weakness and paralysis, and disturbance of vision, swallow-
ing, and speech. Id. Two-thirds of all cases of botulism are fatal, and for those who survive,
recovery is slow. Id. Cholera is characterized by severe gastrointestinal symptoms which
include diarrhea, vomiting, shock, and muscle cramps. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 323 (27th ed. 1988).
41 See SPIERS, supra note 37, at 42-45. British soldiers responded to the first gas attacks
by covering their mouths with rags. Id. at 42. Various masks with filters were developed, but
each design was soon rendered ineffective by the increasing lethality of the agents. Id. at 44.
412 See Baker Spring, America's Options if Iraq Uses Chemical Weapons, 1990 HERI-
TAGE FOUND. REP. 1, 2. U.S soldiers are equipped with a protective rubber mask, a charcoal-
layered overgarment, and rubber boots and gloves. Id. The M-17 mask used by U.S. soldiers
has been heavily criticized by defense commentators while defended by the DOD. See In
Need of Protection, TutE, Feb. 18, 1991, at 23. A former editor of the technical journal
Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defense and Technology claims that the M-17 mask of-
fers little protection, and that the protective suits can be penetrated by chemical agents. Id.
In fact, the currently used M-17 mask was designed in 1955, and has not "been significantly
improved since." Id. In 1986, however, a Government Accounting Office study determined
that the protection was adequate. Id.
There has been much criticism of the protective equipment used by the U.S. military.
See Ben Sherwood, Toxic Shock-Our Chemically Unready Troops, THE NEW REPUBLIC,
May 6, 1991, at 11. A 1973 Army memo listed the M-17's design flaws, including the
wearer's inability to change filters without removing the mask. Id.
'3 See Sherwood, supra note 42, at 6. United States forces in Saudi Arabia had such
little confidence in their chemical warning systems that they placed chickens in boxes at the
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not overwhelming. 44 Due to these limitations in external protec-
tion, soldiers have been issued various drugs to combat internally
the effects of these agents.45 All of these protective measures, in-
cluding the use of the drugs at issue in Sullivan, are necessary to
increase the survival of the unit members who depend on each
other's performance.46
In combat, where chemical or biological warfare is possible, al-
lowing a soldier to refuse treatment would not only increase the
probability of his own death, but may also result in the death of
his comrades and the failure of the military mission.47 Society rec-
ognizes that civilians faced with serious physical harm have the
right to refuse treatment after evaluating the risks for them-
selves.4 s Soldiers who are part of an interdependent combat unit,
however, cannot be allowed to chart their own course in evaluating
risks at the expense of their fellow soldiers and the military objec-
tive.49 Just as soldiers may not decide to enter combat without a
helmet or an M-16 as a matter of personal preference, they may
not decline to accept medical treatment that is designed to pre-
outskirts of a base to detect chemical attacks. Id. An Army Inspector General report in 1989
warned of the weaknesses in the ability to detect an attack. Id. Once a chemical attack is
detected, a soldier is expected to stop whatever he is doing and put on his protective over-
garment, mask, hood, overboots, protective gloves, and individual decontamination kits with
antidotes, all within eight minutes. U.S. ARMY, STP 21-1-SMCT, SOLDIERS MANUAL OF COM-
MON TASKS 424-28 (1987).
" See Sherwood, supra note 42, at 7. A 1986 Government Accounting Office report
revealed that "up to 50% of the masks currently in the field would leak if attacked with
high concentrations of chemical agent." Id.
" See SPIERS, supra note 37, at 65-66. Each soldier is issued an injector kit, equipped
with the approved drugs atropine and pralidoxime chloride, to help counter the effects of
nerve gas. Id. One of the investigational drugs that the DOD received permission to use in
Desert Storm, pyridostigmine bromide, was intended to be taken prior to combat to increase
the effectiveness of atropine. Sullivan, 938 F.2d at 1372.
46 Sullivan, 938 F.2d at 1373. The DOD stated that the safety of other personnel neces-
sitated the mandatory use of the drugs. Id. British forces are also required to take pyridos-
tigmine pills when a chemical attack is likely. See SPIERS, supra note 37, at 65.
" See Sullivan, 756 F. Supp. at 17; see also Edmund G. Howe & Edward D. Martin,
Treating the Troops, HASTINGS CENTER REP., March-April, 1991, at 21, 23.
48 See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text (discussing individual right to choose
treatment).
49 See Informed Consent for Human Drugs and Biologies; Determination That In-
formed Consent Is Not Feasible, 55 Fed. Reg. 52,814-15 (1990) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. §
50.23). A letter dated October 30, 1990, from DOD's Assistant Secretary of Defense to the
Department of Health and Human Services stated, "[i]f a soldier's life will be endangered
by nerve gas ... it is not acceptable from a military standpoint to defer to whatever might
be a soldier's personal preference." Id.; see also Howe & Martin, supra note 47, at 23.
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serve their military effectiveness.5 Servicemembers do not enjoy
all of the rights and privileges of civilians; 51 their individual inter-
ests are subordinated to the military mission".5  Moreover, the gov-
ernment may compel military service 53 and the activities in which
servicemembers engage are not a matter of personal choice.54 As
the nature of war changes with increasing usage of chemical and
biological weapons, the demands made on soldiers to survive must
also change. 5
II. THE AUTHORITY OF THE FDA TO PROMULGATE RULE 23(D)
The FDCA permits the Secretary of Health to promulgate reg-
ulations allowing the use of non-FDA approved drugs for investiga-
tional purposes. 5 6 The informed consent of those to whom these
50 Cf. WILLIAM WINTHROP, Military Law and Precedents 571-75 (2d ed. 1979) (illustrat-
ing rigid guidelines imposed on military personnel). Disobeying a lawful order is punishable
as a crime under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Id. The military crime of "misbe-
havior" is committed when a soldier in combat throws aside arms or willfully does "less than
the utmost to combat the enemy." ROBINSON 0. EVERETT, MILITARY JUSTICE IN THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES 50 (1956). But see George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin,
Treating the Troops: Commentary. HASTINGS CENTER REP., March-April, 1991, at 24, 26
(arguing that administering unproven vaccines is distinguishable from requiring soldiers to
wear "helmets and flak jackets" in that vaccines can cause injury in and of themselves).
One commentator has argued that "to the degree consistent with national security and
military needs," soldiers should be informed of the risks and expected benefits of the treat-
ment; "thus, even if they are ordered to conform, their dignity as persons would be
respected." Howe & Martin, supra note 47, at 22.
I" This Comment does not address the issue of the constitutional rights of ser-
vicemembers. The Supreme Court has held that servicemembers cannot sue for damages
resulting from constitutional wrongs by superiors. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305
(1982); see also Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) ("[T]he rights of men in the
armed forces must perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline
and duty .... ).
52 Howe & Martin, supra note 47, at 23.
'3 See Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 377 (1918) (consolidating six cases chal-
lenging constitutionality of draft law). The Court held that the government's authority to
compel military service was expressly granted by the Constitution in Article I, § 8, which
empowers the Congress to declare war. Id. "The highest duty of the citizen is to bear arms
at the call of the nation." Id. at 368. "It is a contradiction in terms to say that the United
States is a sovereign and yet lacks this power of self-defense." Id.
" See Burns, 346 U.S. at 140.
See SPIERS, supra note 37, at 42-68.
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (1988). The Act states that such regulations are within the
discretion of the Secretary, who is to base any exemption on factors related to the protec-
tion of public health, including preclinical testing and the maintenance of records. Id.; see
supra note 11 (discussing "Investigational New Drugs"). Clearly, the DOD viewed the use of
such drugs as critical to troop survival, and the task of obtaining consent as detrimental to
the troops' best interests. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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investigational drugs are administered is required "except where..
. [the experts administering the drug] deem it not feasible, or in
their professional judgment, contrary to the best interests of [the
recipient]." s  In Doe v. Sullivan, the plaintiff claimed that such
exemptions were limited to instances in which the particular recip-
ient of the drug is not capable of giving or withholding consent
intelligently, thus rendering consent "not feasible. 58 Prior to the
promulgation of Rule 23(d), the FDA followed this interpretation
and deemed informed consent "not feasible" only if communica-
tion with the subject could not be established, and if there was
insufficient time to obtain consent from the subject's legal repre-
sentative.5 9 Doe contended that the term "not feasible" clearly ex-
pressed the unambiguous intent of Congress to apply the exemp-
tion only in cases where the individual was incapacitated.60
It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that if con-
gressional intent is clear, both the court and the agency involved
must give effect to the "unambiguously expressed intent."61 Alter-
7 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (1988). Although formulation of regulations exempting investiga-
tory use of certain drugs from FDCA research requirements is a discretionary act of the
Secretary, there are certain mandatory requirements attendant to their promulgation. Id.
An exemption may be granted only if the sponsor of the investigation requires a certification
from the medical expert using the drug that any humans being administered the drug, or
their legal representative, are informed that the drug's use is investigational and unap-
proved. Id. The exceptions arise only if the experts deem consent "not feasible," or "con-
trary to the best interests of such human beings." Id. As the FDA based Rule 23(d) on the
"not feasible" language, the Sullivan court did not address the "best interests" language.
See Sullivan, 938 F.2d at 1382 n.17; infra note 70.
'8 Sullivan, 938 F.2d at 1382. Doe claimed that the exception could not apply if the
subject "has the capacity intelligently to give or withhold consent." Id.
" Id. The rule regulating informed consent, in effect prior to Rule 23(d), supported
Doe's claim. See 21 C.F.R. § 50.23(a)-(c) (1991). Under Rule 23, before informed consent
may be deemed "not feasible" the investigator and a physician not participating in the in-
vestigation must certify in writing that, inter alia, the human subject is confronted by a life-
threatening situation. Id. Informed consent cannot be obtained due to the subject's inability
to communicate and consent cannot be obtained from the subject's legal representative be-
cause of time constraints. Id.
60 Sullivan, 938 F.2d at 1381. "Doe urged . .. that Congress spoke plainly in the
FDC[A] Act and that FDA failed to give effect to the unambiguously expressed legislative
intent." Id.
61 Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984). Neither the court nor the agency may substitute its will for the "unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress." Id. The courts, as final authorities on issues of statutory
construction, must reject an agency's interpretation of a controlling statute if it is contrary
to the statutory mandate or frustrates the intended policy of Congress. See Federal Election
Comin'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981). When Congress
uses a word "well understood," some interpretive flexibility may be permitted, but its ordi-
nary meaning cannot be disregarded. See Social Sec. Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369
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natively, if the relevant legislative provision is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the issue, then the agency need only apply a "per-
missible construction of the statute. 's2 Nowhere in the statutory
language or the legislative history is the term "not feasible" de-
fined.6 3 The FDA has altered its interpretation of "not feasible" to
include the urgent circumstances of imminent combat and the re-
sultant risks to the soldiers' lives. 64 Agency regulations interpreting
ambiguous statutory terms are given controlling weight unless they
are arbitrary, capricious, or clearly contrary to the intent of the
statute. 5 Deference is accorded even if the agency displays "a
(1946). In Nierotko, the word at issue in the Social Security Act was "wages," used to spec-
ify which receipts were to determine taxes and benefits. Id. As Congress did not delegate to
the Social Security Board the power to determine what compensation could be treated as
"wages," the Court struck down the Board's regulation excluding back-pay from wages. Id.
While considerable weight may be accorded an agency's interpretation, if congressional in-
tent is clear with respect to the precise question at issue, there is no alternative but to give
effect to that intention as law. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44; see also Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 390 U.S. 261, 272 (1968) (noting court does
not "rubber-stamp" administrative decisions inconsistent with statutory mandate).
62 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. In the absence of specific congressional intent on the
point at issue, the court may not fill the void with its own construction. See R. POUND, THE
SPIRIT OF THE COMtMON LAW 174-75 (1921). The court's own construction of a statute would
be permitted and necessary only in the absence of administrative interpretation. See Chev-
ron, 467 U.S. at 844.
When the statute is ambiguous, the question for the court is limited to whether the
agency's construction is permissible or "sufficiently reasonable." See Federal Election
Comm'n, 454 U.S. at 39. In the absence of "a clearly enunciated legislative purpose," where
an agency's interpretation is supported by a reasoned analysis, the court may uphold the
regulation. Id. at 42. The court need not find that the agency's construction of the statute is
one that it would have chosen if given the opportunity to do so, nor that it is the only
reasonable interpretation. See Udall v. Talman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (quoting Unemploy-
ment Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153 (1946)). Indeed, if the meaning of the words at
issue is not clear, the administrative interpretation "becomes of controlling weight unless it
is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." See Bowles v. Seminole Rock &
Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
13 Sullivan, 938 F.2d at 1382. The remarks by Senators Kefauver and Javits repeat the
statutory language of the informed consent provision, but do not define it. Id.; 108 Cong.
Rec. 22,042-43 (1962) (discussing significance of provision as a whole).
Sullivan, 938 F.2d at 1382. "Not feasible" is now interpreted by the FDA to mean
"impracticable" and is thus not limited to situations in which the patient is physically inca-
pacitated. Id. The court found the circumstances under which Rule 23(d) applied, i.e., "par-
ticularly urgent circumstances: a combat-zone setting, the safety of military personnel at
that location, and the compelling need to promote success of the service members' mission,"
to be within the ordinary meaning of the words in the statute. Id.
"5 See Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981). The task of the court is
limited to ensuring that the interpretation is not arbitrary or capricious, or outside the stat-
utory authority. Id.
The relationship between courts and agencies is not analogous to the relationship of
appellate courts to lower courts. See generally 2 CHARLES H. KOCH JR., ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW
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sharp break with prior interpretations." 6 The agency's choice of
AND PRACTICE § 9.5 at 93 (1985). Rather than the "clearly erroneous" standard of review
applied by appellate courts to trial court rulings, the judiciary is limited to making a deter-
mination of the arbitrariness of agency action. Id. Active judicial participation in the admin-
istrative process negates the advantages of using administrative decision making, and blurs
the separation of powers with respect to policy-making. Id. §§ 9.5 & 9.17. The "arbitrary
and capricious" standard has developed to preserve the integrity of the administrative pro-
cess by allowing a "high risk of error" to be tolerated. Id. § 9.6, at 96. Although the term
"arbitrariness" is without clear meaning, it invokes a lesser degree of scrutiny than a reason-
ableness standard, allowing "a greater tolerance for error." Id. at 97. To pass the reasonable-
ness test, administrative decisions need not be uniform, but each must be "within the
boundaries of sound judgment" to be upheld. Id. at 100. The standard of arbitrariness is
significantly lower, as a rejected decision must be "totally intolerable [and]... outside any
conceivable alternative." Id. Federal law also directs that a reviewing court strike down any
agency ruling that is "capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law." 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1966); see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 414, (1971) (setting forth classic instruction on question of arbitrariness).
An unexplained policy change by the agency has often been held to be arbitrary, and
thus not deserving of the usual deference. Democratic Union Organizing Comm. Local 777,
v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1978). In Local 777, the issue disputed was whether
taxi drivers who leased cabs from a company were employees or independent contractors.
Id. at 869. The court of appeals found that the NLRB had repeatedly reached conflicting
decisions in identical cases without announcement of a "principled reason," and refused to
enforce an order of the board until it received an intelligent rationale. Id. at 882.
The leading Supreme Court case finding arbitrariness in agency action involved the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHSTA) rescission of passive restraint
requirements for automobiles. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46-57 (1983). The Court recognized that judicial restraint is necessary in
applying the arbitrariness test, but found no credible explanation of why the NHSTA did
not pick from the various safety measure alternatives rather than disavow all new require-
ments. Id.
Absolute certainty of its position is not necessary on the part of the agency. See Balti-
more Gas and Elec. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1983). In
Baltimore Gas a table promulgated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") to
evaluate the effects of nuclear fuel cycles was challenged as not having a sufficiently certain
basis. Id. at 93. The Court reasoned that the technical complexity of the topic and the in-
depth rationale presented by the NRC overshadowed the absence of certainty, thus its deci-
sion was "within the bounds of reasoned decision making." Id. The Court also stated that it
would be most deferential when reviewing a scientific determination as opposed to a finding
of fact. Id.
66 Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1769 (1991). Title X of the Public Health Service
Act permitted the Secretary of Health and Human Services to grant federal monetary assis-
tance to family planning projects. Id. at 1764. Section 1008 provided that none of the funds
could be used in programs where abortion was a method of birth control. Id. at 1764-65.
Until recently, the department of Health and Human Services had interpreted the section
to permit nondirective counselling related to abortion services. Id. at 1765. In 1988 the De-
partment promulgated a new regulation denying Title X funds to those projects providing
counselling related to abortion. Id. Relying on its rationale in Chevron U.S.A v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the Court held that the regulation was
entitled to deference, despite the "sharp break" with prior interpretation, because, inter
alia, it was supported with a reasoned analysis. Id. at 1769.
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seemingly conflicting legislative policies should not be disturbed
unless such action clearly appears to be outside the scope of con-
gressional intent.6 7 It is proposed that Congress would likely ap-
prove of a rule necessary to save the lives of soldiers. Following the
current standards for reviewing legislative rulings by an agency, it
is suggested that the district court and the Court of Appeals of the
District of Columbia correctly found the promulgation of Rule
23(d) to be within the FDA's power.
III. THE APPLICATION OF RULE 23(D)
The phrase "experimental drugs and the military" conjures up
images of the United States Army's LSD tests and radiation exper-
iments on unconsenting soldiers in the 1950s, and the barbarous
experiments conducted by the Nazis on prisoners during World
War I118 The Defense Department Authorization Act now prohib-
its the use of DOD funds to perform such research on unconsent-
ing human subjects; the plaintiff in Doe challenged the application
of Rule 23(d) as violative of this act.6 9 Doe maintained that the
DOD's use of investigational drugs amounted to "research; ' 70 how-
ever, the Sullivan court never decided whether this use was "re-
search" or "treatment."' 71 It is submitted that Rule 23(d) is nar-
rowly drawn to allow the administration of unapproved drugs only
when it is beneficial to the recipient and not for experimentation
"7 See United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961). In Shimer, the Serviceman's
Readjustment Act of 1944 was determined to have the purpose of enabling veterans to ob-
tain loans with the least risk of loss upon foreclosure. Id. The plaintiff contended that the
relevant state law on deficiency judgments was applicable, while the government claimed
that the Veteran Administration's ("VA") regulation applied. Id. at 383-85. The Court held
that the administration's policy choice was a "reasonable accomodation of [conflicting] stat-
utory ends." Id. at 385. There were also indications from the act itself and its legislative
history that the regulation would further the intent of Congress. Id. at 386-87.
" See supra note 11 (discussing treatment use of new drugs).
" See Doe v. Sullivan, 756 F. Supp. 12, 15-16 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 938 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir.
1991). The application of Rule 23(b) during the Gulf War was moot on appeal. Sullivan, 938
F.2d at 1375; supra note 30 and accompanying text.
7' See Sullivan, 756 F. Supp. at 12.
71 See Robert J. Levine, Treating the Troops: Commentary, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
March-April, 1991, at 27. The distinction between "research" and "treatment," the former
unquestionably requiring consent under the DOD Act, is not clearly drawn. Id. (presenting
several conflicting views on proper distinction). The fact that the drugs are labeled "investi-
gational" is misleading, "many unsophisticated persons think mistakenly of the use of such
drugs as research." Id. at 28. The drugs used by the DOD during the Gulf War had, in fact,
been approved at higher dosages, for other purposes. See supra note 18 and accompanying
text.
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or research. The procedures outlined in Rule 23(d) were created to
avoid the possibility of soldiers being used as human guinea pigs.7 2
The DOD can request that the FDA Commissioner find informed
consent "not feasible" only for a specific combat exigency, when
"witholding treatment would be contrary to the best interests of
military personnel and there is no available satisfactory alternative
therapy.'73 In making this determination, the Commissioner must
consider four factors: the context in which the drug will be admin-
istered; the nature of the information that would be provided to
the recipient; the strength of the safety evidence and the effective-
ness of the drug; and the nature of the disease or condition to be
treated.74 Thus, the FDA Commissioner is a non-military reviewer,
outside the DOD, that must objectively assess the benefits and
risks of drug treatments and the burden of obtaining informed
consent.75 The purpose of any application of the rule must be to
treat soldiers in the best interests of their health; the Commis-
sioner may not waive the informed consent requirement for what is
essentially an experiment.76 Additionally, the Commissioner may
revoke his determination at any time in light of changed circum-
stances.77 In Sullivan, the FDA approved the DOD's request be-
cause the proposed mandated use of the drugs was clearly in the
best interests of the soldiers and the purpose was not to experi-
ment, but to treat inevitably deadly conditions.78 The policy be-
hind Rule 23(d) is sound; it protects the best interests of soldiers
in combat while simultaneously furthering the military objective. 9
CONCLUSION
The DOD is now restricted in its ability to compel ser-
vicemembers to submit to non-approved treatments by a narrowly
71 See supra note 21 (setting forth text of Rule 23(d) including provision that exception
be applied only in "a specific military operation involving combat or the immediate threat
of combat").
73 21 C.F.R. § 50.23(d)(1) (1991).
74 Id. § 50.23(d)(2). The Commissioner's review is not limited to these factors. See id.
"I Howe & Martin, supra note 47, at 22; see 21 C.F.R. § 50.23(d)(1) (1991).
71 See 21 C.F.R. § 50.23(d)(1) (1991); B.D. Colen, Secret Drug Testing on Soldiers in
Gulf OK'd, NEWSDAY, Jan. 4, 1991, at 7. A Pentagon spokesperson objected to the critic's
labelling of the drugs as experimental since they have been successfully used to treat other
conditions. Id.
77 See 21 C.F.R. § 50.23 (d)(4) (1991) (Rule 23(d)(4))
78 See Sullivan, 938 F.2d at 1374.
79 Id.; see 21 C.F.R. § 50.23(d) (1991).
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drawn informed consent exception that serves the public interest
by protecting servicemembers and permitting the attainment of
the military objective. Rule 23(d) is a rare exception to the rule of
informed consent. This exception satisfies the unique demands of a
military unit in combat and warrants the authority to compel ser-
vicemembers to take certain drugs in order to protect themselves
and their comrades. The rule's strict requirements preclude experi-
mentation on servicemembers and effectuate its vital purpose:
treating servicemembers to ensure their survival on the modern
battlefield.
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